Americans' inability to synthesize these different schools into a single, coherent development philosophy. 3 Marquis' work is a useful guide to the various intellectual approaches that Americans applied in Vietnam; however, he is ultimately unable to demonstrate whether or how the sharp differences among these ideological camps affected nation-building outcomes in Vietnam. 4 This essay is an attempt to explore the contested and contingent meanings of some of the US-sponsored nation-building programs established in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) during the 1960s. As such, it both builds on and departs from other recent work on nation building and modernization during the twentieth century. In his popular critique of the style of modernization that he dubs "high modernism," James Scott includes a moral plea for more attention to metis-that is, the various forms of indigenous knowledge that disappear as people in rural areas become more deeply engaged in globalizing processes. 5 Scott's call to preserve local know-how certainly highlights the tremendous destruction that nation building can leave in its wake; however, it is not clear how this concept is relevant to 1960s South Vietnam-a society in which the lines between "the local" and "the foreign" (or between "traditional" and "modern") had long been By focusing on nation building in the Mekong Delta province of An Giang during the peak years of the Vietnam War, this essay will suggest how historians might begin to assess the effects of nation building within a Vietnamese historical framework. Such a history necessarily focuses on particular places and on the specific social and environmental conditions that shaped the course and outcome of the nation-building projects undertaken there.
Despite the universalist aspirations inherent in nation building, Vietnamese experiences with nation building during the 1960s varied widely. I have chosen An Giang because it figured prominently in American discourse about nation building in the RVN. I have also chosen to focus on the relatively narrow timeframe of the existence of the CORDS program (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) to illustrate how the vagaries of local places often subverted the broader developmentalist agendas emanating from Sài Gòn and Washington.
As a cultural and physical landscape, An Giang Province (Figure 1 ) was unique in several ways. Ruled largely by civilian officials and a militia affiliated with the province's Hòa HOo Buddhist majority, the province was unusually safe for Americans-a condition that persisted even after the T!t Offensive. The anomalously peaceful nature of the province attracted attention both in Sài Gòn and in Washington. As President Johnson pushed for an "other war" to "win hearts and minds" in the rest of the RVN, An Giang became a showcase for "accelerated development." At the same time, An Giang was deemed to be a laboratory in which the validity and applicability of American theories of modernization could be demonstrated in a controlled environment that was free of the disruptions of warfare.
In assessing the course and fate of these nation-building initiatives, I make use of the rich archival sources produced by American provincial advisors during their tenures in An Giang. A close reading of these reports reveals why the history of American-sponsored nation building in the RVN cannot be explained solely by reference to American ideology. The American social scientists and military personnel who went to An Giang in this period intended to be agents of material, social, and political change. However, they were also witnesses to Vietnamese actions and practices, and they frequently found themselves acting as impromptu ethnologists as they scrambled to make sense of the social and political reality that they encountered in the province. In their analyses of local events and in their routine reporting on various centrally sponsored development programs, these Americans showed that they were acutely aware of the power associated with older, indigenous modes of doing things. Moreover, they described how they often joined with Vietnamese partners to find local alternatives to the one-size-fits-all approaches favored by Washington or Sài Gòn. By reading these American sources against the grain, it thus becomes possible to Leaving by bus from the Mijn Tây station in Ch/ L&n, Oka and a friend traveled for about an hour into the delta before reaching a traffic jam. Two of the bridges in Đinh TMKng Province near Mm Tho were out, blown up the night before by guerrilla sappers. Their bus had to wait in line to cross a temporary pontoon bridge, so they decided to walk to the heavily damaged bridge and cross it on foot. They then hopped aboard a crowded, threewheeled Lambretta motor scooter, which carried them to the next bridge, also destroyed. There, they met a bus headed to the ferries that traversed the two main branches of the Mekong River. After crossing the H$u Giang In Figure 4 , the rectangular grid of the resettlement hamlet, with small homes roofed in thatch, contrasts with the much larger homes and warehouses along the canal, covered almost exclusively in tile or metal roofing.
Behind the single line of homes and orchards along the canal bank can also be seen a largely natural drainage area where fields of floating rice were cultivated, with light-toned circles designating threshing platforms. 25 Such American sociopolitical experiments in An Giang clearly did not achieve the objective of assimilating the "perfumed" countryside into an odorless, cosmopolitan, and urban state. Nor did they ever prove that communal and millenarian religious leaders in the province were better equipped to maintain peace and prosperity than secularly minded provincial authorities.
What the records do illustrate is both the dynamic complexity of the Amer- 
